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abstract
This chapter, which focuses on the first post-colonial constitutions created at the time of 
African independence, addresses four questions. How were these constitutions made? 
Did they build a social contract between states and citizens? Is there a clear typology 
of constitutions in Africa corresponding to the political differences between the colonial 
powers? What was the long-term effect of these first post-colonial constitutions?
how were the constitUtions made?
Generally speaking, the constitutions adopted when african countries became 
independent were the results of negotiations between colonial governments 
and local political leaders. 
in the cases of french colonies, in 1956 reforms introduced universal 
suffrage for territorial advisory councils as well as representation in the French 
national assembly in Paris: at this point the french republican Constitution 
prevailed in african colonies (rothermund 2006, p 12). limited degrees 
of suffrage had existed from 1946, with qualified African voters sending 
representatives to the national assembly (wilson 1994, pp 146-148). thereafter 
these elected local leaders drafted the constitutions enacted at independence. 
the case of Côte d’ivoire is illustrative. after a nearly unanimous referen-
dum in 1958 calling for the territory to become a republic within a francophone 
African community a Constitution was drafted by Ivorian officials, amended 
by a committee within the ivorian national assembly, approved by the leader 
of the main political party, then a  parliamentarian in Paris, and subsequently 
adopted by the ivorian assembly. 
a subsequent revised Constitution was passed without debate by the 
assembly immediately after independence in 1960. it installed a presidential 
system in which the separately-elected president could circumvent the 
assembly by calling referenda over legislative reforms. the 1960 Constitution 
also provided for elections conducted through national lists ‘elected by a 
single majority on a single ballot’, in effect ensuring a politically monolithic 
Parliament (Zolberg 1969, pp 263-265). within this Parliament legislating 
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was a very confined function: the president could curtail any law-making 
proposal by any of its members on the advice of a constitutional chamber 
whose members he appointed. in practice, most legislation would be proposed 
by the president (alexander 1963).
in french territories, elected african politicians played a decisive role 
in constitutional drafting (le vine 1997, p 184). however, notwithstanding 
the role played by elected bodies and referenda in approving constitutional 
proposals, any public debate about their content was abruptly curtailed. 
this was the case even in those instances, as in tunisia, where constituent 
assemblies were elected for this purpose.
in british colonial africa nationalist politicians generally acceded to 
constitutional drafts which were ‘fashioned in the main by british craftsmen … 
cut to westminster’s pattern’ (seidman 1969, p 83). there is much less evidence 
than in francophone africa of national politicians exercising any choice over 
constitutional content (hatchard 1998, p 381). where there were disagreements 
between local leaders the main issue in contention was the extent to which 
the government should be organised through a federal system. 
only in nigeria did the federal dimension of constitution-making in 
the british african decolonisation era survive to the present, but this was 
because it was favoured by the electorally predominant northern political 
elite.  nigeria’s regional governments had several key competencies including 
control over local land tenure as well as direct access to marketing board 
revenues. Elsewhere in British Africa the efforts to devolve power downwards 
from national law-making bodies did not have long-lasting effects.
for example, in the then Gold Coast (now Ghana), a national liberation 
movement (nlm) emerged in opposition to kwame nkrumah’s Convention 
People’s Party (CPP), then governing in partnership with the colonial 
administration. the nlm, based in the ashanti kingdom, called for an 
indissoluble federation, elected regional parliaments and division of revenues 
between the regions and the centre, as well as basic guarantees of human 
rights (austin 1970, pp 278-279). a british constitutional advisor recommended 
instead regional assemblies with delegated powers, well short of what the 
nlm was asking for. the nlm boycotted the Constitutional assembly, which 
endorsed these proposals. 
in an electoral contest in which ‘the issue was really independence 
under CPP rule or delay and federation’ (wilson 1994, p 146) the CPP 
emerged victorious. subsequently a demoralised nlm leadership accepted a 
Constitution which provided for regional assemblies with powers decided by 
the Ghanaian Parliament, the retention of the british Queen as head of state, 
a prime minister and a Cabinet responsible to Parliament. Constitutional 
changes would require a two-thirds majority and, in the case of key clauses, 
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consent from the regional assemblies. This safeguard was ineffectual. When 
the assemblies were elected in 1958 their powers were so circumscribed that 
the ashanti opposition boycotted the elections. the ruling party-dominated 
assemblies then voted for their own abolition.     
elsewhere in british africa dissolution of federal arrangements required 
force. Uganda’s first Constitution, in 1962, conferred federal status on the 
kingdom of buganda, which sent its own representatives to the national 
assembly. these could be elected indirectly by the lukiiko, a body in which 
the king exercised strong influence. In 1963 the Bugandan king or Kabaka 
was elected as the ceremonial head of state to replace the governor-general. 
at this stage the non-buganda uganda People’s Congress was functioning in 
an alliance with the kabaka against buganda modernisers in the democratic 
Party (Mugaju 1988, p 94). 
after winning the pre-independence elections in 1962 the uganda People’s 
Congress was able to exploit rural resentments about the landlord-dominated 
kabaka yekka to amass support. in 1966 a new ‘interim’ constitution removed 
the residual legislative powers of the bugandan government. in 1967, after 
soldiers occupied the kabaka’s palace, a third constitution ended all sub-
national legislatures and withdrew recognition from any traditional rulers 
(Jorgensen 1981, p 231).   
In the case of the Belgian Congo, a constitutional ‘round table’ met briefly 
in brussels in January 1960, attended by 44 Congolese politicians. the belgians 
hoped that a European-staffed bureaucracy would retain influence over a 
nominally independent african-elected government. Congolese political 
parties had contested the first local government elections, in 1957, so that by 
1960 there was an established political elite, mainly supported by the ethnic 
groups predominating in each of the five biggest towns. The Congolese 
participants, though from a range of parties, announced that a front commune 
would prevail among them during the negotiations. 
on the whole, though, the main Congolese concern was to establish a 
swift timetable for independence rather than to finesse constitutional detail. 
a Loi Fondamentale in 1960 constituted an independent Congo on the basis of 
arrangements ‘copied with very few alterations from the belgian blueprint’ 
(young 1965, p 176). as in belgium, a largely ceremonial head of state was 
intended to formally appoint a prime minister who would act as a head of 
government responsible to Parliament (Juergensmeyer 1964, pp 164-165). at 
the time this was decided many of the politicians, belgian and Congolese, 
present at the round table assumed this head of state would continue to be 
the king of belgium, whose behaviour would be shaped by the conventions 
of constitutional monarchy. hence the precise division of powers between 
the head of government and head of state was left undefined.
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in brief, decolonisation constitution-making, though sometimes con-
tested, as in Ghana, was hardly the consequence of extended deliberation. 
Particularly in british africa it was often conducted through a drafting process 
undertaken by colonial or even metropolitan civil servants and with debates 
normally focusing on the few issues considered most salient by members of 
the national political elite. understandably, they tended to focus on those 
aspects of the constitution that had most bearing on their ability to gain access 
to executive power and to retain it. for example, in settings in which political 
parties were constituted around ethnic groups, leaders of ethnic minorities 
tended to favour federal dispensations. leaders of dominant groups or 
successful ethnic coalitions supported unitary constitutional arrangements. 
a social contract between states and citizens? 
On the whole, these first-generation African constitutions omitted extensive 
contractual obligations between governments and their citizens. in general, 
their treatment of civil rights was perfunctory, though francophone african 
constitutions, which took their starting points from french republican 
precedents, were more likely to elaborate commitments to citizen’s rights. 
for example, 12 of the 78 clauses of the 1959 tunisian Constitution 
concerned basic freedoms and rights, though most of these were qualified 
with reference to such concerns as ‘the respect for public order’. rights clauses 
were accorded ‘organic’ status, with demanding requirements for their change, 
but even so, amendment of the Constitution, a presidential prerogative, could 
be undertaken by a simple parliamentary majority after a majority vote in 
a referendum. a Constitutional Council could review all ‘organic laws’ but 
presidential nominees prevailed in the council. 
by contrast, the Ghanaian Constitution of 1957 contained much less 
language about rights; specifically, guarantees of rights were limited to 
voting, freedom from discrimination and protection of linguistic minorities 
(frempong 2007, p 6). this particular Constitution was replaced by the 
republican Constitution of 1960, which, among other changes, accorded to 
the first president of Ghana the right to issue legislation by decree, bypassing 
Parliament (Juergensmeyer 1964, p 162). the earlier rights-based provisions 
were replaced with ‘fundamental principles’ that the president swore an oath 
to protect (apter 1972, p 353). 
Replacement of Ghana’s Constitution was not difficult in a setting in which 
the ruling party predominated. british drafters engaged in decolonisation 
constitution-making were disinclined to introduce major procedural barriers 
to block constitutional change (fombad 2013, p 387). in botswana, which has 
one of the few first constitutions to have survive to the present mainly intact, 
entrenched provisions required a referendum for any change, but no turnout 
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requirements were stipulated and changes have been approved, as in 2001, 
on a turnout of less than 5%. mauritius is rather exceptional in this respect: 
the key clauses in its 1968 Constitution can only be changed by a referendum 
and a unanimous vote in the national assembly (fombad 2013, pp 406-408).
The rights emphasised in different constitutions sometimes reflected 
the recent history of the countries concerned. Compare, for instance, the 
brevity of Chapter two of the 1963 kenyan Constitution’s treatment of rights 
of assembly and expression with the extensive detail of the provisions that 
restrict the government’s ability to expropriate land without compensation or 
the equally conscientious definitions of rights of citizenship, both a reflection 
of a colonial setting in which immigrant settlers were able to take ownership 
of large tracts of fertile farmland. Ironically, the efforts by the drafters of 
kenya’s ‘lancaster house’ Constitution to promote indigenous african land 
access today supply the constitutional foundation for the political use of land 
as a patronage resource. 
As noted above, in most African countries it was not difficult for the 
new ruler to change the constitution or even replace it entirely. victor le 
Vine counted 50 post-independence constitutions up to 1989, including five 
constitutions each in nigeria and Ghana. the most common alteration was to 
reinforce executive powers, with legislatures reduced to agreeing to legislation 
intro duced by the president. in certain military regimes parliaments some-
times disappeared altogether (le vine 1997, p 189). Changes would also 
formalise single-party regimes and subordinate the judiciary to executive will.
Not all constitutions changed significantly. The Senegalese and Ivorian 
constitutions remained more or less in their original shape, though, as noted, 
in the ivorian case the Constitution itself ensured that only one party would 
win representation in elections.  
various changes in senegalese electoral provisions imposed by the 
ruling political leadership also ensured that between 1962 and 1975 senegal 
functioned as a de facto one-party state (beck 1997). botswana and mauritius 
are still governed by almost the same constitutional provisions that were in 
place at the time of their independence (fombad 2013, p 389). 
Constitutional changes were more marked in the english-speaking former 
colonies, beginning with the replacement of the british Crown with locally 
chosen presidents. the nigerian republic of 1963 divided powers between a 
president and a prime minister; the president had the capacity to remove a 
prime minister who failed to retain majority support within the legislature. 
more commonly, the head of state functions of the presidency were combined 
with the executive role of a prime minister, as happened in Ghana and 
tanzania when they become republics. 
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in certain anglophone african republics, for instance nigeria, kenya, 
uganda and sierra leone, civil service commissions retained their consti-
tutionally prescribed independence but in Ghana and tanzania these were 
abolished (seidman 1969, p 108). Judicial independence was also an early 
casualty of anglophone republicanism; in nigeria in 1963 the prime minister 
assumed the function of appointing judges, taking this role over from the 
Judicial service Commission (seidman, p 109). despite this development, 
Nigerian judges were vigorous champions of the Bill of Rights in 1970 (Paul 
1974, p 861).
the extent to which constitutions underwent change and the speed at 
which it happened, particularly in the case of anglophone africa, the absence 
of any real engagement of local political elites, let alone the wider public in 
the detailed drafting of first constitutions might suggest that their political 
impact was ephemeral. at least one critic has suggested that the underlying 
logic informing the way that these constitutions were written was at odds 
with the political realities of their settings. 
writing at the end of the 1960s seidman (1969, pp 122-123) observed that 
‘the control devices developed in western nations appropriate to a regime 
based on contract’ were absent from africa. looking back over a much 
longer period of post-colonial history, this view seems too pessimistic. there 
is plenty of evidence that members of colonial african political elites had a 
ready familiarity with the western canon of constitutional thought: in 1947 
tom mbotela translated tom Paine’s Rights of Man into kiswahili (atieno 
odhiambo 1988, p 118). however, in the 1960s, whether there was a wider 
understanding of the rights associated with citizens is questionable, so in that 
sense these constitutions lacked the status of social contracts.
one very obvious legacy still evident today of the way these decolonisation 
constitutions were written is the divide in modern african politics between 
regimes which broadly conform to british parliamentary tradition in which 
the head of government or head of state is the leader of the majority party 
in Parliament and the more president-dominant system which prevails in 
french-speaking africa, and in which Parliament is often constituted by a 
multitude of small parties. 
Of the five purely parliamentary regimes – Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
mauritius and south africa – four are former british colonies. several others 
draw their Cabinets from the majority in Parliament, with ministers remaining 
accountable to Parliament, in this way retaining a key feature of the early 
parliamentarian systems of the first post-colonial democracies. 
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is there a clear typology of constitUtions in africa 
corresponding to the political differences between the 
colonial powers? 
there was initially a clear distinction between ‘neo-presidentialist’ systems 
in which Parliament chooses the president and the ‘reinforced presidencies’ 
elected separately and which can legislate independently (Juergensmeyer 1964, 
pp 174-175). These two groups corresponded to the early difference between 
anglophone westminster regimes that emphasised parliamentary sovereignty 
and the francophone Gaullist systems. especially in the british west african 
territories, westminster principles were reproduced quite faithfully. 
heads of governments and their Cabinets were drawn from the pre-
dominant group in Parliament and they remained subject to votes of no 
confidence. The Cabinet assumed collective responsibility for its decisions. 
initially, the british queen remained as head of state, represented by 
‘governors-general’. various measures restricted government interference in 
the appointment of civil servants and judges (Ghai 1972, p 411; Le Vine 1997, 
p 185). 
however, conformity between regimes and colonial lineage soon 
collapsed as english-speaking heads of government decided to repudiate 
inherited models of restrained executives in favour of what they insisted were 
‘autochthonous’ or native traditions of presidential absolutism (Prempeh 2013, 
pp 209-235). meanwhile, several former french colonies maintained french 
constitutional provisions on the presidency ‘word for word’ (le vine 1997, 
p 184). ironically, the expansion of african absolutism was facilitated by the 
constitutional flexibility and silences and consequent discretionary powers 
accorded to the executive that are features of a british tradition of assuming 
that assertive parliaments check power more effectively than more elaborate 
institutional restraints (seidman 1969, pp 110-112).  
it is also the case that formal parliamentary sovereignty in anglophone 
Africa was an insufficient condition for parliaments to exercise any real 
assertiveness. Though presidents were subject to votes of no confidence these 
were unlikely given the frequent predominance of a single party. by the end 
of the 1960s ‘[o]n only one occasion [had] a government bill been defeated 
by Parliament in any country in independent anglophonic tropical africa’ 
(seidman 1969, p 101). the occasion was when the tanzanian government tried 
to introduce end-of-service gratuities for ministers in 1968. in 1969 in nigeria 
the average length of time between the introduction of a government bill in 
the federal Parliament and its adoption was two hours (seidman 1969, p 101). 
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much academic assessment of these independence constitutions suggests 
that they were ‘dysfunctional duplications of the former colonial master’ (Go 
2002, p 559). as observed immediately above they mostly tried to reproduce 
metropolitan institutions, but they also addressed local concerns. this was 
especially the case if constitution-making was accompanied by ethnic or racial 
conflict. Bills, or at least Chapters of Rights, featured in African settings where 
such provisions might help to defuse tensions, as in kenya and uganda; their 
absence from the Tanzanian Constitution was a reflection both of haste and 
of a nationalist mobilisation that did not feature sharp communal divisions 
(Ghai 1972, p 411): the british believed that nyerere’s administration would 
continue to rely on the services of senior British officials for a decade after 
independence (Pratt 1982, p 280).  
for british drafters of such constitutions, rights bills could not be based 
on their own experience, given the absence of a written constitution in britain. 
in nigeria, where local political leaders were worried about the likelihood 
of oppression by ethnic rivals, drafters drew their references to rights from 
the 1950 european Convention on human rights and the nigerian language 
was mimicked in other subsequent anglophone constitutions adopted at 
independence (Go 2002, p 579). in former french colonies certain constitutions 
incorporated phraseology from the 1789 declaration of the rights of man and 
the Citizen; this was the case in upper volta and dahomey, though others 
drew their provisions from the universal declaration of human rights (1948), 
a deliberate distancing from the metropole (Go 2002, p 580). 
respecting rights, racial or ethnic minorities in the run-up to independence 
had leverage because in british african colonies independence was conditional 
on consensus about constitutional issues, especially if the minority were 
immigrant british settlers. hence, in certain settler colonies very particular 
concerns could find expression in minute constitutional prescription. For 
example, in kenya, as Ghai (1972, p 411) notes, ‘it was considered essential to 
establish through the Constitution’ which government body should be charged 
with managing public toilets. in fact, the kenyan Constitution addressed 
more fundamental preoccupations of the settler minority, including issues of 
land ownership and property – key concerns also in other ex-settler colonies 
such as Zambia. of all the anglophone constitutions kenya’s was the most 
complicated until the Zimbabwe settlement of 1980 (Paul 1974, p 855). in kenya 
key concerns were protected by requirements of a 75% vote in the lower house 
and 90% in the senate before any change could be made.   
on the whole, francophone african independence constitutions were less 
likely to depart from metropolitan precedent to provide for local circumstances, 
partly because of the rather longer gestation period before colonial africans 
began to be incorporated as full citizens rather than subordinate territorial 
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subjects. After all, the Four Communes – the main coastal towns – of Senegal 
had sent representatives to french parliaments through the 19th century and, 
from 1914, these deputies were indigenous africans. 
The Senegalese deputy would be joined in Paris by other elected African 
representatives after the extension of the fourth republic to embrace all 
French colonies. Leopold Senghor, first president of Senegal in 1958, served 
as a deputy in Paris from 1951. north african french colonies departed from 
french secularism in giving islam special constitutional status and insisting 
that the president should be a muslim (le vine 1997, p 184). 
So, are there clear distinctions between constitutions that reflect the 
metropolitan political traditions of the main colonial powers? 
At first, forms of government differed significantly between English-
speaking and french-speaking africa, but as anglophone countries reinforced 
their executives with the help of deferential parliaments these distinctions 
lessened. the british were more likely to construct arrangements to devolve 
power to sub-national units as well as to introduce rights to address minority 
concerns: on the whole, these were given short shrift by post-colonial rulers. 
There are other differences between the anglophone and francophone 
groups that have endured. anglophone constitutions did not usually prescribe 
the details of the electoral system, or provide for the number of constituencies 
or the extent of the franchise. but silence or omission encouraged the following 
of british precedent and most parliamentary elections in anglophone africa 
are still conducted in single-member constituencies through the first-past-
the-post system. francophone constitutions tended to be more prescriptive 
and most francophone african elections still use a two-round system adapted 
from french practice. 
a key consideration in encouraging the retention of colonially instituted 
constitutional traditions was the normal requirement that to stand for 
Parliament candidates must speak either english or french: Ghana and 
tanzania removed this requirement early but elsewhere it was retained for 
much longer. the language issue points to wider aspects of high politics: so 
often it was shaped by educational traditions that drew upon metropolitan 
norms. as le vine noted in 1997: 
the documentation on the Conferences nationales that were held in benin and 
mali [in 1990] reveal traces, albeit more implicit than explicit, of the french 
constitutional mythology still taught in their schools that has become part 
of the elite political culture.
national constitutional conferences were a key feature of the democ ratisation 
of francophone Africa after 1990, a reflection of the French revolutionary legacy 
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(robinson 1994): of the 11 that were held between 1990 and 1994 nine were in 
french-speaking countries (bratton & van de walle 1997, p 111).  
what was the long-term effect of these first post-
colonial constitUtions? 
in the reconstruction of liberal democracy in the 1990s the older constitutional 
forms of early independence were partially revived in certain anglophone 
settings. for example, Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, while borrowing from the 
American system an elected executive president subject to a two-term limit, 
also stipulated that most ministers would be chosen from Parliament and be 
responsible individually. it also returned to Parliament a degree of legislative 
authority. 
in Ghana the president can nominate a portion of his Cabinet, but 
these appointments require parliamentary assent. however, cutting across 
westminster conventions, only the president can introduce bills concerning 
finance (Prempeh 2008, p 20). meanwhile, ministers can still legislate 
without parliamentary assent (Prempeh 2007, p 498). and in 2010 nigerian 
parliamentarians failed in their litigation against the principle of constitutional 
amendments requiring presidential assent in a key challenge to executive 
authority.
several francophone african countries did modify their traditions of 
presidential autonomy with the institution of prime ministers who were 
expected to command a majority in the National Assembly as well as with 
the enhancement of judicial constitutional review (Fomunyoh 2001). Even 
in settings in which national assemblies have remained deferential rubber-
stamp-type institutions, the prime ministers have sometimes exercised 
significant power as was the case in Mali’s first government after the 1992 
Constitution, in which Prime minister boubacar keita was ‘seen as a near 
rival in power to the presidency’ (smith 2001, p 76). 
Mali, in its first term of democratic government after 1990, is a benign 
example of efforts to check presidents through prime ministers who were 
accountable to Parliament. it worked in a setting in which the president 
could command a sizeable and stable majority in the Assembly. In three 
other african countries in which prime ministerships were established, the 
shifting dynamics of coalition politics led to the president having to share 
power with a prime minister voted into office by a parliamentary opposition. 
this happened in niger in 1996 and in Congo in 1997. Political deadlock when 
‘co-habitation’ became acrimonious prompted military takeovers (kirschke 
2007; moestrup 1999). 
in benin, where a prime ministership was established before the new 
Constitution was drafted, the first incumbent, Nicephore Soglo, who later 
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became president, enjoyed considerable executive authority conferred on him 
by a transitional Haut Conseil. The office retained importance even under a 
regime that remained strongly presidential in a setting in which, in a very 
fragmented party system, the clientelist maintenance of parliamentary 
coalitions requires attentive management (allen 1992). francophone 
maintenance of executive presidencies was not just a consequence of elite 
predispositions. in benin in 2002 the draft constitution was put to a freely 
contested public referendum and was opposed by a group advocating a 
parliamentarian system: the ‘no’ vote amounted to only 7% of the total.  
Judicial review has also been a feature of several post-1990 constitutions. 
Prempeh’s assessment of the performance of supreme courts and consti-
tutional courts in undertaking this function is that too often they have 
upheld the older tradition of a ‘jurisprudence of executive supremacy’ (1999, 
p 139). He is especially critical of Ghanaian and Kenyan judges. Unusually, 
the deferential predisposition of Botswana’s judges was sharply criticised in 
a South African High Court judgement (Tolsi 2011). 
Prempeh notes, however, the way that benin’s Constitutional Court has 
defended rights of assembly against government attempts at restriction. 
benin’s court is rather exceptional, partly because of the scope of human rights 
issues the Constitution itself addresses and also because of the liberal rules 
that govern citizen access to the court (rotman 2004). in benin, the national 
assembly nominates a proportion of the court’s members and this, too, has 
helped to strengthen its autonomy from the executive. 
in reality, though, only one of the new democracies, ethiopia, restored or 
established full parliamentary sovereignty, or two, if one counts south africa, 
where the racially exclusive Parliament’s sovereignty was curtailed by the 1984 
constitution. three – lesotho, botswana and mauritius – have retained this 
feature of their original dispensations. more common was the partial return 
to Parliament of powers to introduce legislation and ministerial accountability. 
But even with these competencies one difficulty has been that with the 
proliferation of parties very fragmented parliaments struggle to exercise 
any effective oversight. Generally, parliaments that remained substantially 
constituted by members of the old single-ruling parties or by larger groups 
that replaced them, as in Zambia, have found it easier to accumulate leverage 
in their relationship with the executive (bratton & van de walle 1997, p 247). 
Parliaments may have been strengthened by the term limits that were a 
distinctive and new feature of african constitution-making in the 1990s: 33 
of the 37 new constitutions adopted by 1994 included presidential term limits 
(bratton & van de walle 1997, p 113). in the past ten years these provisions have 
been substantially eroded, though, as Charles fombad and david Zounmenou 
explain in their chapters in this volume.
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it is likely that common law inherited by former british colonies 
maintained judicial assertiveness and protect civil liberties measurably better 
than the republican civil law doctrines that shaped legal and constitutional 
practice in francophone africa (Joireman 2001). in any case, over time, inherited 
constitutional traditions have become more publically influential. In 2011, in 
senegal, one of the few african countries in which the constitutional order 
has remained more or less unaltered since independence, the opponents 
of President abdoulaye wade, who was seeking a third term in office, 
campaigned against him with the slogan ‘touche pas a ma constitution [do 
not touch my constitution]’ (my italics) (kelly 2012, p 127). 
conclUsion
we can now provide answers to the four questions posed at the beginning 
of this chapter.
How were these constitutions made? They were more likely to reflect 
local elite preferences in french-speaking africa, where, in some instances, 
politicians had been the beneficiaries of a metropolitan strategy of political 
and cultural assimilation. in british africa african nationalist leaders assented 
to constitutions drafted by colonial officials who often included in their 
drafts special measures to protect minority concerns. wider kinds of civic 
engagement were generally absent from constitution-making.  
to what degree did these constitutions represent social contracts between 
states and citizenry? the language of rights and obligations was more 
universally conspicuous in francophone african post-colonial constitution-
making than was the case in former british colonies, where rights served more 
particularistic functions. Partly for this reason, in today’s francophone africa 
popular political protest is more likely to be rights-based.
to what degree did these constitutions replicate metropolitan models? 
anglophone african constitutions established parliamentary systems, but 
these were swiftly replaced. francophone constitutions followed french 
fourth republican precedent and institutionalised executive supremacy 
from the start. Post-1990 reforms have attempted to modify presidential 
prerogatives by assigning powers to both parliaments and courts; several 
of the more successful instances of such transfers have been in francophone 
african countries.  
Have these first constitutions had long-term effects? This is the case 
more obviously in francophone countries, but if we consider wider aspects 
of political life in french- and english-speaking africa – in their electoral 
and party systems, for example – it is still possible to discern differences 
that correspond to colonial lineage and the different metropolitan styles of 
state-making. 
